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Brian J. Love 
Assistant Professor of Law 
Co-Director, High Tech Law Institute 
Santa Clara University 
500 El Camino Real 
Santa Clara, CA 95053 
 
May 6, 2015 
 
The Hon. Michelle K. Lee 
Under Secretary of Commerce 
Director, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
 
Re: Requests for Comments on Enhancing Patent Quality 
 
Dear Director Lee: 
 
I write to you today in response to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) Request for 
Comments on Enhancing Patent Quality, published February 5, 2015.
1
  My comment proceeds in 
two parts.  First, I share two general observations about the PTO’s current slate of New Quality 
Proposals:
2
 specifically, it fails to include any reforms that apply post-issue or any reforms that 
exercise the PTO’s fee-setting authority.  Second, building on these observations and two recent 
empirical studies of mine, I outline two proposals that I urge the PTO to consider: specifically, 
an increase in maintenance fees and a decrease in fees for post-issue administrative challenges. 
 
I. Current Slate of Proposals Ignore Post-Issue Solutions and Fee-Setting Authority 
 
The PTO should broaden, in at least two respects, the scope of potential changes that are 
presently on the table.  First, I urge the PTO to consider quality-enhancing reforms that apply to 
issued patents, not simply those that impact applications under examination.  At present, the 
PTO’s New Quality Proposals all involve modifications to examination procedures.  Any set of 
reforms that focuses exclusively on examination is incomplete. For a number of practical 
reasons, problematic patents will continue to issue for the foreseeable future, regardless of 
current efforts to improve the prosecution process.
3
 Moreover, reforms that focus exclusively on 
prosecution ignore the millions of U.S. patents presently in force,
4
 the vast majority of which 
                                                          
1
 80 Fed. Reg. 6475 (proposed Feb. 5, 2015), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/02/05/2015-
02398/request-for-comments-on-enhancing-patent-quality. 
2
Id. 
3
 For example, current rules for claim construction permit the meaning of claim language to expand over time to 
cover after-arising technology that was unforeseeable at the time of examination.  See Mark A. Lemley, The 
Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2005). Also, it is especially difficult, if not 
impossible, for examiners to locate prior art in nascent, rapidly-evolving fields that lack a comprehensively indexed 
technical literature. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 
89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 43 (2001); Note, Estopping the Madness at the PTO: Improving Patent Administration 
Through Prosecution History Estoppel, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2164, 2171 (2003). 
4
 At present there are well over two million U.S. patents in force.  See Dennis Crouch, How Many U.S. Patents Are 
In-Force?, PATENTLY-O (May 4, 2012, 10:19 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/05/how-many-us-
patents-are-in-force.html (estimating that there were about 2.1 million patents in force in May 2012). 
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issued during previous eras when examination and patentability standards were far more lax.
5
  
The PTO’s efforts to improve patent quality should not end with a notice of allowance, but rather 
should extend throughout the term of patent protection. 
Second, I urge the PTO to consider using its fee schedule as a tool for improving patent 
quality.  When selecting the current list of New Quality Proposals, the PTO failed to draw upon 
its full range of powers, which now includes fee-setting authority.
6
  Though PTO fees have 
historically been overlooked as a tool for effecting policy goals, fee-setting authority may well 
be the most powerful policy lever at the PTO’s disposal.  Because a patent’s value depends in 
large measure on its quality, owners of low-quality patents are the most sensitive to fluctuations 
in patent office fees and, thus, the most likely to allow their existing patents to expire and reduce 
their future filings in response to a fee increase. Accelerated expiration of low-value patents and 
a marginal drop in low-value applications will improve overall patent quality in two ways.  It 
will do so directly by reducing the quantity of questionable patents and applications. It will also 
do so indirectly by increasing the quality of legitimate patents that issue in the future.  This is 
because a decrease in the number of patent applications frees up PTO resources to examine with 
greater care the smaller number of applications that are filed.  In its efforts to improve patent 
quality, the PTO can, and should, also exercise its power to adjust fees. 
 
II. Specific Reform Proposals 
 
Building on these general observations, I ask the PTO to consider two specific proposals that 
leverage PTO fees to enhance the quality of issued patents: (1) an increase in maintenance fees to 
hasten the expiration of low-quality patents, and (2) a decrease in filing fees for post-grant 
administrative challenges to make it possible for more accused infringers, especially small and 
medium-sized businesses operating outside the tech industry, to take advantage of those 
procedures in defense against low-quality patents asserted in court. 
 
A. Increase Maintenance Fees 
 
Low-quality patents impose costs on society principally when they are asserted for purposes 
of collecting nuisance value settlements, and older patents are among those most often enforced 
in an abusive manner.  In a recent empirical study of the ages of asserted patents, I found 
significant disparity between the relative ages of patents asserted by product-producing tech 
companies and those asserted by non-practicing entities (NPEs),
7
 the subset of patentees most 
                                                          
5
For example, in recent years the PTO has issued tens of thousands of software patents annually. See Christina 
Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289 (2012) (estimating that, circa 
2012, about 40,000 software patents issued annually); James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at 
Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157 (2007) (estimating that, circa 2004, roughly 20,000 software 
patents issued annually).  Many of the claims in these patents now cover unpatentable abstract ideas under Alice 
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
6
 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316-17 (2011), available at 
http://www.bitlaw.com/source/America-Invents-Act/10.html.  As previously interpreted by the PTO, this provision 
gives the agency “flexibility to set individual fees in a way that furthers key policy considerations.” Setting and 
Adjusting Patent Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 55,028 (proposed Sept. 6, 2012). 
7
 Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could A Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls 
Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1309 (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917709. 
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able to leverage the high cost of patent litigation to induce nuisance-value settlements.
8
 Notably, 
I found that companies that acquired patents purely for enforcement purposes were responsible 
for more than two-thirds of patent suits, naming more than four-fifths of all individual 
defendants, filed in the last five years of the asserted patent’s term.9  This variance in litigation 
timing in my sample was so dramatic that all suits asserting the average product-company patent 
were resolved before the average NPE patent was asserted for the first time.
10
  In short, old 
patents are among those that are least likely to be used by tech companies to protect new 
products from their competitors—the sine qua non of the patent system—and, instead, among the 
most likely to wind up in the hands of companies that specialize in filing abusive lawsuits en 
masse against established technologies. 
Unfortunately, the PTO’s present maintenance fee structure is ill-equipped to hasten the 
expiration of low-quality patents before (or while) they are misused.  For one, there are too few 
payments required and payments obligations end too early in the patent term.  Under current 
rules, the final of three maintenance fee payments is due 11.5 years after issuance,
11
 many years 
before the term of protection ends for most patents and often before abused patents wind up in 
the hands of those who misuse them.
12
 As a result, the cost of renewal overwhelmingly falls on 
legitimate innovators using the patent system as intended, rather than unscrupulous entities that 
acquire vague patents late in the term for the purpose of exploiting weaknesses in the litigation 
system.  Annual renewal fees that phase in gradually during the latter half of the patent term 
would more efficiently accelerate the expiration of patents as soon as the inventions they were 
originally filed to protect become obsolete.
13
   
In addition, maintenance fees are currently too low. Ideally, fees should be set at levels that 
require patent owners to internalize the full social costs of their patent rights, much like 
“Pigovian” taxes on gasoline or aluminum cans ensure that consumers internalize the full social 
costs of their purchasers.
14
 Though estimates of the deadweight loss of the patent system vary, 
even a conservative estimate would safely place the total in the billions of dollars, if not the tens 
of billions, per year.
15
  As a result, the average annual cost of maintaining one of the roughly two 
                                                          
8
 For a general discussion of why NPEs can impose asymmetric costs in patent litigation and how this often leads to 
nuisance value settlements, see Informational Hearing on Patent Assertion Entities before the California Assembly 
Select Committee on High Technology (Oct 30, 2013) (statement of Brian J. Love, Assistant Professor of Law, Santa 
Clara University), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm.?abstract_id=2347138.    
9
 Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing, supra note 7, at 1340. 
10
 Id. 
11
 Fee Schedule, U.S. Pat. and Trademark Off., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm. 
12
 Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing, supra note 7, at 1333 (“Patents do not reach acquisition 
firms until about 9.5 years after issue [on average], and these firms wait 2.4 additional years on average before filing 
suit.”). 
13
 See James E. Bessen & Brian J. Love, Make the Patent “Polluters” Pay: Using Pigovian Fees to Curb Patent 
Abuse, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 84, 89 (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2277692 (calculating several hypothetical fee structures, 
including a structure in which fees increase geometrically beginning in the twelfth year after issue). 
14
 Id. at 87-88. Other commentators have also argued that renewal fees should be used to ensure that patentees 
maintain their patent rights for a socially optimal period of time.  See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, On the 
Optimality of the Patent Renewal System, 30 RAND J. ECON. 181 (1999); Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, 
Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND J. ECON. 197 (1999). 
15
 See RPX, 2014 NPE Cost Report at 2, http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/05/RPX-2014-
NPE-Cost-Report-Zfinal.pdf (estimating that “companies in 2014 spent more than $12 billion in legal fees, 
settlements, and judgments to resolve NPE patent disputes . . . . a major portion of [which went] to the unnecessary 
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million patents presently in force should at a minimum exceed $1,000 per year,
16
 and perhaps 
should reach $10,000 per year or more.
17
  Today, even large entities are charged fees that, on 
average, amount to much less—under $750 per year.18   
In addition to better aligning patentees’ incentives to obtain patents with the social costs of 
those rights, increased fees would also help align U.S. patent fees more closely with those 
required in the past, as well as in those required today in other parts of the world.  Today’s patent 
fees are relatively low, both internationally and historically.
19
 Many countries, including the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Canada, already charge annual maintenance fees after the 
first few years of patent protection.
20
 Perhaps not coincidentally, these jurisdictions also 
experience a much lower incidence of abusive patent enforcement.
21
  Also, relative to GDP per 
capita, U.S. patent fees are near historical all-time lows.
22
  Measured this way, fees today are 
about one-tenth as expensive as they were in 1800.
23
 
In short, by increasing the frequency and size of maintenance fee payments, the PTO can 
significantly mitigate the social costs that low-quality patents impose by decreasing the supply of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and significant expense of litigating patents as a precursor to a resolution”); James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The 
Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387 (2014) (estimating that NPE suits resulted in $29 billion 
in direct costs to accused infringers in 2011, about 5% of which was transferred back to inventors from whom 
asserted patents were acquired and another 15% of which was used to fund in-house invention programs carried out 
by a small number of NPEs).  Both estimates exclude other sources of deadweight loss, such as defendants’ indirect 
costs from NPE suits (like diversion of resources and delays in new products), not to mention all direct and indirect 
costs attributable to patent disputes between product-producing companies. 
16
 In its simplest form, a “Pigovian” patent fee structure would dictate that if the roughly two million patents 
presently in force impose a social cost of well over $2 billion a year, then patent maintenance fees should, on 
average, cost well over $1,000 per year of protection. 
17
 See Bessen & Love, supra note 13, at 89 (calculating several “Pigovian” fee schedules using an estimated social 
cost of $23 billion per year).  It presently costs roughly as much to maintain widespread patent protection in Europe, 
a region that remains popular with inventors. See Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 
The Role of Fees in Patent Systems: Theory and Evidence, 27 J. ECON. SURVEYS 696, 716 (2013), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2011.00712.x/pdf. 
18
 Collectively, the three maintenance fee payments required today total $12,600 for a large entity.  Fee Schedule, 
U.S. Pat. And Trademark Off., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm. Prorated over an 
average term of protection of seventeen years, those fees come to an annual average of just over $740 per year. 
19
 See de Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, supra, at 699-701. 
20
 Renew A Patent, Intell. Prop. Off. (U.K.), https://www.gov.uk/renew-patent (explaining that in the UK patents 
must be renewed “on the fourth anniversary of when you filed for it [and] . . . . then [again] . . . every year near the 
‘due date’”); German Patent & Trademark Office, PCT Applicant’s Guide 5 (2014), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/guide/en/gdvol2/annexes/de.pdf (explaining that fees are “payable for the third and each 
subsequent year following the international filing date”); Schedule of Fees, Japan Pat. Off., 
http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/ryoukin_e/ryokine.htm (showing a schedule of annual renewal fees); Canadian 
Intellectual Prop. Off., Manual of Patent Office Practice § 24.02.01 (last updated 2014), available at 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/vwapj/rpbb-mopop-eng.pdf (“In order to maintain a patent 
application in effect, an applicant must pay maintenance fees for each one-year period from the second anniversary 
of the filing date of the application.”). 
21
 See Christian Helmers et al., Is There a Patent Troll Problem in the U.K.?, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 509, 526 (2014) (finding that, between 2000 and 2010, NPEs filed just 11% of all patent suits in the U.K.).  
Compared to the U.S., there are fewer patent disputes (per patent) in most European nations, and European patent 
disputes are cheaper than their U.S. counterparts.  See Stuart J. H. Graham & Nicolas van Zeebroeck, Comparing 
Patent Litigation Across Europe: A First Look, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 655 (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924124. 
22
 See de Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, supra, at 699-701. 
23
 Id. 
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low-quality patents available for use in abusive suits, as well as increasing the costs borne by 
those entities likely to abuse them. 
 
B. Reduce Fees for Post-Issue Administrative Review 
 
Like maintenance fees, post-issue administrative challenges also help weed out low-quality 
patents issued in the past.  In the last two years alone, thousands of invalid claims in hundreds of 
issued patents have been eliminated in inter partes review (IPR) and other forms of post-grant 
challenges.
24
 Many of these patents earned millions of dollars in unwarranted settlements before 
being eliminated.
25
 
While, on the whole, post-grant challenges have proven to be very beneficial to those 
accused of infringing low-quality patents, companies that are most susceptible to abusive 
litigation—small businesses and downstream purchasers of the accused technology26—have been 
reluctant to pursue them to date.  In a recent empirical study, I found that technology purchasers 
and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are both underrepresented among IPR 
petitioners relative to the share of patent suits filed against them.
27
  Though over a third of patent 
suits in recent years accused technology purchasers of infringement, purchasers represent less 
than 7% of IPR petitioners.
28
  Similarly, while SMEs were targeted in about 30% of patent suits 
during the same period, just 21% of IPRs are initiated by SMEs.
29
 
A likely explanation for this underrepresentation is the relatively steep cost of IPR.  Though 
certainly cheaper than full blown litigation, IPR still generally costs in excess of $250,000, an 
amount that leaves ample room for patentees to leverage low-quality patents into nuisance value 
settlements.  Though there may not be much the PTO can do to reduce cost of legal fees for IPR, 
the PTO can lower the fees required to file a petition.  Currently, petition and institution fees 
total at least $23,000, with no discount for small or micro entities.
30
  For cost-conscious 
petitioners, these fees represents close to ten percent of the entire cost of pursuing an IPR 
                                                          
24
 See Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 93 (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2512519. 
25
 For example, a patent asserted widely by Data Treasury in a litigation campaign that netted over $350 million in 
settlements was recently invalidated by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.  Matthew Bultman, DataTreasury 
Patents Nixed By PTAB In AIA Review, Law360 (April 29, 2015), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/649511/datatreasury-patents-nixed-by-ptab-in-aia-review. 
26
 Since 2011, many patentees, including Innovatio IP Ventures, MPHJ, and ArrivalStar, collectively sued hundreds 
of small businesses outside the tech industry—including restaurants, hotels, and trucking companies—and 
threatened to sue tens of thousands more, while generally offering to settle for less than the cost of mounting the 
slightest defense.  See, e.g, Brian J. Love, Inter Partes Review as a Shield for Technology Purchasers: A Response 
to Gaia Bernstein’s The Rise of the End-User in Patent Litigation, 56 B.C. L. REV. at *1-2 (forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2576919 (summarizing this phenomenon and 
collecting citations). 
27
 Id.  
28
 Id. at *7. 
29
 Id. at *11. 
30
 Fee Schedule, U.S. Pat. and Trademark Off., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm (listing 
a $9000 filing fee for IPR and a $14,000 “post-institution fee,” as well as $200 and $400 per claim “excess” claim 
fees at each respective stage).  Post Grant Review and Covered Business Method Review are even more expensive.  
Id. (listing a $12,000 filing fee PGR/CBM and a $18,000 “post-institution fee,” as well as $250 and $550 per claim 
“excess” claim fees at each respective stage). 
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petition to a final decision.  By contrast, the filing fee for a civil suit in federal court is a mere 
$350.
31
 
Decreasing the filing and institution fees for petitioners—or, at a minimum, creating a fee 
discount for small and micro entities—will make those procedures more affordable to the parties 
that would benefit from them the most.  As a result, more low-quality patents will be eliminated 
and, in turn, fewer nuisance suits will be filed in the future. 
 
* * * 
 
I urge the PTO to take a broader view of what its present patent quality initiative can 
accomplish.  Efforts to enhance patent quality should additionally include efforts to improve the 
overall quality of the pool of issued patents.  Moreover, the PTO should draw upon all its 
powers, including the power to set fees, to meet its quality-enhancing goals.  The benefits of 
doing so promise to be immense. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
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 28 U.S.C. § 1914. 
